EPSTEIN
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Copr. (C) West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
Not Reported in F.Supp.
(Cite as: 1998 WL 67676 (S.D.N.Y.))
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
Jeffrey E. EPSTEIN and Ivan S. Fisher, Defendants.
No. 96 Civ. 8307(DC).
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
Feb. 19, 1998.
Mary Jo White, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, by
Serene Nakano, Assistant United States Attorney, New York City, for the United
States.
Gage & Pavlis, by G. Robert Gage, Jr., Ellen J. Casey, New York City, for Ivan
S. Fisher.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CHIN, J.
*1 In this case, the United States (the "Government") seeks to evict defendants
Jeffrey E. Epstein and Ivan S. Fisher from a building formerly used as a residence by
the Deputy Consul General of the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran"). After diplomatic and
consular relations with Iran were severed in 1980, the Office of Foreign Missions
("OFM") of the United States Department of State took possession of the building
pursuant to the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. s 4301 et seq. OFM leased the
building to Epstein in 1992. Epstein eventually sublet the premises to Fisher,
purportedly without the Government's consent. Fisher, in turn, sublet a portion of the
premises to several other lawyers.
In 1996, the Government purported to terminate Epstein's lease and brought this
action to evict Epstein and Fisher. The other sub-tenants were later added as
defendants. The Government also seeks to recover back rent from Epstein and Fisher.
During discovery, the Government requested production of Fisher's 1996 tax
return to verify the amount of rent that he had collected from his subtenants. Fisher
objected to the request. At a conference on December 10, 1997, I overruled the
objection on the condition that the return be protected by an appropriate confidentiality
order, which the parties were to negotiate. Fisher and the Government, however, were
unable to agree on the terms of a protective order. Hence, they submitted separate
proposed protective orders for my consideration.
The Government's proposed order contains a provision ("Proposed Paragraph
7(c)") that would permit the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York to disclose any confidential information governed by the protective order to
other government agencies for the purpose of enforcing the criminal or civil laws of the
United States. Thus, the Government seeks to reserve the right to use confidential
information produced by Fisher in this case in unrelated civil or criminal matters. The
Government contends that Proposed Paragraph 7(c) is necessary because the U.S.
Attorney's Office has a statutory duty to enforce the laws, citing 28 U.S.C. s 547(c), and
that it therefore cannot ignore any evidence of a violation of law--even evidence that
comes to its attention only because it is produced pursuant to a protective order in
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discovery in a civil case. Fisher objects to Proposed Paragraph 7(c). He contends that
use of any confidential documents produced in this case should be limited to this
lawsuit.
Fisher's objection is sustained, for three reasons.
First, confidentiality orders are intended "to 'secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination' of civil disputes by encouraging full disclosure of all
evidence that might conceivably be relevant." Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir.1979). Unless protective orders are "fully and fairly
enforceable," persons relying upon such orders will be inhibited from providing
essential testimony and information in civil litigation, "thus undermining a procedural
system that has been successfully developed over the years for disposition of civil
differences." Id. A provision that would permit the use of confidential information
outside of this lawsuit would defeat the very purpose of the protective order.
*2 Second, although the Court recognizes the strong public interest in obtaining
all relevant evidence required for law enforcement purposes, the Govemment as
investigator "'has awesome powers' [that] render unnecessary its exploitation of the
fruits of private litigation." Id. (quoting GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 415 F.Supp.
129, 132 (S.D.N.Y.1976)). Proposed Paragraph 7(c) should not be included in the
protective order "merely to accommodate the Government's desire to inspect protected
[information] for possible use in a criminal [or civil] investigation." Martindell, 594 F.2d
at 296; cf. id. (denying Government's order to modify or vacate protective order to
permit it access to witnesses' deposition transcripts protected by the order). The
Government will still be able to fulfill its statutory obligation to enforce the law through